Abstract. Online Social Networks (OSNs) are very popular and users share various information in these networks. To protect these resources from unauthorized access, these frameworks must support exible access control mechanisms. Semantic technology provides new opportunities for this purpose. This paper proposes a Prioritized OntologyBased Access Control (POBAC) model for protecting users' information in OSNs. In POBAC, Description Logic (DL) is used for modeling of security-related information in social networks as an ontology and MKNF + rules are used for speci cation of system's and users' access control policies. Using MKNF + , we can utilize non-monotonic inference (i.e., closed-world reasoning) in the access control procedure. Furthermore, users are able to de ne their access control rules, exceptions, and default policies. The potential con ict among di erent access control rules de ned by users and the system is another problem, which is resolved in POBAC by considering priority levels for rules in a logical manner. Logical foundation of the model dedicates accuracy, expressiveness, and inference (of implicit access rules from the explicit ones) to the model and thus decreases the risk of sharing information in OSNs. The expressive power of the model is demonstrated through a case study.
Introduction
Online Social Networks (OSNs) are currently considered as one of the important aspects of the Web. Users in OSNs make pro les and share di erent types of resources such as personal information, photos, notes, and videos with others. Moreover, users can establish relationships and communicate with each other. Making these contents available to others raises some privacy and security concerns for users and imposes new security requirements for access control systems employed in these environments. Some of these new security requirements are as follows:
In OSNs, there is no central authority in the system and users themselves determine which groups of users could be authorized to access their resources. De ning a list of authorized users for each resource is a cumbersome job for users. Therefore, an expressive policy speci cation language is needed to enable users to easily de ne their access control policy; OSNs are dynamic environments. Users change their relationships with others dynamically. If users like to make a list of authorized users accessing their resources, they should update such lists continually. Thus, the access control mechanism must be dynamic.
The traditional access control models (such as discretionary, mandatory, or role-based access control) as well as the models speci cally introduced for OSNs until now are not rich enough to cover all security requirements of these environments. The main problems and weaknesses of these models are as follows:
The policy rules are coarse-grained in the existing models; however, we need to specify more negrained policy rules considering di erent types of relationships which are de ned in social networks between users and their shared resources; In the existing models for OSNs, all people with the same relationships with a user have the same access; however, in practice, a user may di erentiate between his/her colleagues in giving access to his/her personal photos; Most of the existing models for OSNs are not exible and expressive enough in de ning access rules by users to their resources and provide just a limited set of static rules; In OSNs, there are various types of resources with di erent properties and there are various types of relationships between users. A proper and errorprone access control model for OSNs should model and consider all types of the entities existing in these environments and their properties and relationships in access policy speci cation, con ict resolution, and policy inference.
The semantic technology can play an important role in a more expressive access control model for OSNs. Semantic technology encodes meanings in an abstract layer separate from data and content les, and separate from application code by describing the structure of the knowledge we have about them. With semantic technology, adding, changing, and implementing new relationships between the entities or interconnecting programs in a di erent way can be as simple as changing the external meta-data that these programs share. A run-time semantic data model, which is more often leveraged to represent and share knowledge in a distributed world using semantic technology, is ontology, which is speci ed by a logical language. In fact, using the ontology of entities in OSNs specifying their semantic relationships and employing an expressive logicbased language for policy speci cation and inference make the de nition and management of access control policies much easier and reliable than traditional access control models. Description Logic (DL) is an appropriate language for knowledge representation. Wide use of DL, especially in ontology de nition languages such as OWL (Ontology Web Language), makes it a suitable choice as a policy speci cation language at the rst glance. However, DL has some limitations such as lack of support of rules and non-monotonic inference. The limitation of DL can be compensated by the other main family of knowledge representation logics called logic programming. Therefore, a hybrid logic can be an appropriate solution for use as a policy speci cation language.
In this paper, a Prioritized Ontology-Based Access Control (POBAC) model for OSNs is proposed. In the proposed model, DL is used to describe concepts, roles, individuals, and relationships among social network entities. As description logic does not support rules, we use MKNF + [1] as a combination of Description Logic (DL) and Answer Set Programming (ASP). Using MKNF + in the proposed model has the following advantages:
It increases the expressive power of description logic by incorporating rules; As arity restriction does not exist in ASP predicates, de ning access control rules is easier in this logic; It is possible to have some non-monotonic features such as default rule speci cation, closed-world reasoning, and exceptions.
POBAC is aimed at providing an expressive policy speci cation language which enables the users and the system in an OSN to de ne and infer their access control policy in an easier way without worrying about the incompatibility, coherence, and coverage of access rules in presence of complicated semantic relationships in these environments. This model substantially extends our initial model proposed in [2] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related access control models proposed for OSNs. In Section 3, a brief overview of MKNF + is presented. In Section 4, a simple OSN is modeled. Formal speci cations of the proposed access control model are described in Section 5. Section 6 addresses the security policy speci cation in the proposed model. Section 7 describes the access control procedure of the proposed model and analyzes time complexity of this procedure. A case study to demonstrate the applicability of the model is given in Section 8. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper.
Related work
Boyd and Ellison [3] described some privacy and security issues in OSNs. Carminati et al. [4] proposed a semi-decentralized access control model for such environments. In their proposed model, the relation type, distance, and trust among users were considered as parameters that could be used for de ning access control policies. Fong et al. [5] formalized the access control mechanisms behind Facebook. Carminati et al. [6] proposed using the semantic web tools for enforcing access control policies. Authorization, administration, and ltering policies were mentioned as di erent types of policies which could be de ned by users in OSNs. Such policies are modeled by OWL and Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL). Masoumzadeh and Joshi [7] considered protecting the relationships among concepts in their proposed model. They mentioned that users should have the ability to control visibility of their relationships; furthermore, their proposed model supported de ning multi-authority access policies. In comparison to the aforementioned models [6, 7] , we propose to use MKNF + instead of SWRL for de ning access policy rules. SWRL is a kind of Horn-like rules. It is a combination of OWL and the unary/binary Datalog Rule Markup Language. In MKNF + , predicates with arbitrary arities can be de ned. Moreover, in contrast to SWRL, which is monotonic, MKNF + enables non-monotonic reasoning by supporting negation-as-failure. Using MKNF + , users can de ne more complex policies such as exceptions and default policy. Furthermore, in the proposed model, instead of using simple con ict resolution approaches such as denials-takes-precedence, the prioritybased approach is used to resolve con icts among access control rules. Further to users' policies, the system access policies are also considered in the model.
Various models have been proposed for con ict detection and resolution among access control rules. Bertino et al. [8] proposed to de ne weak and strong authorizations. In their model, strong authorizations had priority over weak authorizations. Cuppens et al. [9] proposed an Organization Based Access Control (OrBAC) which supported con ict detection and resolution. They restricted the structure of rules that users could de ne for preserving decidability. Javadi et al. [10] augmented non-monotonic features to OrBAC using MKNF + logic. To the best of our knowledge, no prioritized ontology based access control model has been proposed for OSNs yet.
Finding an appropriate logic that is a combination of DL and rules for policy speci cation and inference in OSNs with the mentioned characteristics has been a challenge in our proposed access control model. Several frameworks have been proposed for combining DLs and rules. AL-log [11] combines ALC with positive Datalog programs. DL-log [12] was proposed to extend AL-log. DL-log supports disjunctive Datalog with negation as well as binary predicates. Such frameworks use the DL-safety condition as a restriction on the integration of ontology and rules. According to the DL-safety restriction, each variable in a rule should occur in a non-DL atom in the rule's body. This restriction a ects the expressive power of the framework. CARIN [13] is a framework that does not respect safe interaction between DL and rules. In fact, unrestricted interaction among DL and rules would limit the expressiveness of at least one DL or rule. Donini et al. [14] used autoepistemic operators and added negation-as-failure to ALC. In this paper, we use MKNF + as a formalism which combines DL and rules. In comparison to the proposed formalisms, to the best of our knowledge, MKNF + is the most powerful decidable formalism proposed for combination of description logic with rules [ For example, the rule (from [1] ) KseasideCity(x) KportCity(x); not:seasideCity(x) says that port cities are on the seaside by default unless there is evidence to the contrary. More details about MKNF and its formal semantics can be found in [1, 16] . Each DL and ASP knowledge base can be translated into MKNF. Such possibility was used in MKNF + . Each MKNF + knowledge base is a pair K = (O; P ), where O is a DL knowledge base and P is a program ( nite set of MKNF + rules). Predicates de ned in O are called DL-predicates and other predicates are called non-DL-predicates. DL-predicates are unary or binary predicates, but non-DL-predicates are not bounded.
Moreover, two types of modal atoms, namely K-atom and not-atom, are de ned in this formalism. The semantic of MKNF + is based on the MKNF semantic. In fact, each part of MKNF + knowledge base, namely O or P , is translated into MKNF separately (see [1] for further explanation of the MKFN + semantics). The structure of an MKNF + rule is as follows:
where, B i can be a non-modal predicate, a K-atom, or a not-atom, whereas H i would be either a non-modal predicate or a K-atom. To preserve the decidability of MKNF + , the DL-safety restriction must be applied; each variable in a rule should appear in the body of the rule in some non-DL K-atom. The main idea of the DL-safety condition is to restrict the applicability of the rules only to the individuals that are explicitly speci ed by name in the knowledge base.
Online social network model
Using semantic technology and especially OWL language can facilitate knowledge sharing, knowledge reuse, and interoperability among systems. Due to the diversity of OSNs, it is not possible to cover all information of entities existing in various OSNs in a prede ned ontology. The idea of dividing the ontology into the upper-level ontology and the domain-speci c ontology can be used for resolving this issue. Therefore, our proposed ontology consists of two layers:
1. Upper-level ontology is a high-level ontology, which represents the main general entities and their attributes. Such entities can be used in various OSNs and are required for our proposed access control model; 2. Domain-speci c ontology is a more detailed ontology, which describes speci c concepts and their relationships in an OSN, further to the main concepts. Due to the existence of a variety of OSNs, considering this ontology facilitates the extension of upper-level ontology. In contrast to the upper-level ontology, which is xed for all OSNs, the domainspeci c ontology might be de ned and customized for each OSN separately.
The upper-level ontology is represented in Figure 1 and consists of the following concepts:
Entity: A virtual concept by which all other concepts are subsumed; Subject: This concept models all the subjects existing in an online social network; Action: By using this concept, various actions being done by subjects in OSNs are modeled; Object: Various resources are shared in OSNs. These types of resources are de ned as subconcepts of Object concept; Priority: Users can de ne various priority labels for their access rules. These priority labels are de ned as individuals of the concept Priority. In addition to Priority, the role HasMorePriority is de ned in the upper-level ontology for representing relations among the de ned priority labels.
Further to the above concepts, the role Owns(Subject, Object) and the assertion Subject(Sys) are included in the upper-level ontology. In POBAC, the subject who owns the object can de ne its related access control rules. The information of the object's owner can be modeled using the role Owns. Also, in order to distinguish system level from user level access control rules, the individual Sys is de ned as a member of the Subject concept (for more details, see Section 6.2). The rules speci ed by Sys determine the system's general access control rules. In addition to the upper-level ontology, a simple ontology for modeling of general OSNs is proposed in Figure 1 to prove the applicability of POBAC for OSNs. The ontology can be easily extended to support other OSNs' requirements.
Various concepts such as Note are de ned as subconcepts of Object in the ontology. Each object might have di erent properties. For example, the topic property for a note is de ned using the object property HasTopic. Various applications can be created by developers using the APIs provided by OSNs. Users should be able to control which part of their information may be accessed by such applications. To consider the applications, subjects are categorized as Person and Application. Various types of groups and events are de ned by users in OSNs. Furthermore, various relationships can be de ned among users and other entities. For example, IsFriendOf is de ned between two users or relations such as HasPro leInfo, IsMemberOf, and AttendIn and it can be de ned between a person and individuals of the types Pro leInfo, Group, and Event, respectively. Hence, employing such an ontology enables the model to consider di erent types of relationships between users and infer appropriate access policies without wondering about the dynamic nature of such relationship instances in OSNs. Note that in POBAC, Description Logic (DL) is used for specifying the concepts and their relationships (as terminological box{TBox{in DL knowledge-base), and the instances of the de ned concepts and relationships (as some assertions in assertion box{ABox{of DL knowledge-base), which provides inference capability for the model.
Due to the use of DL for ontology de nition and MKNF + predicates and rules for security policy speci cation, two types of predicates are de ned, namely, description logic predicates (which are represented by upper case names in the paper) and non-DL-predicates (which are represented by lower case names in the paper). Moreover, all individuals are de ned as members of the non-DL-predicate e. For example, if Alice shares a new note called Note 1 with her friends, Note (Note 1 ) and e (Note 1 ) are added to the knowledge base. By doing so and using the predicate e in the body of access control rules, the DL-safety restriction (which is introduced in Section 3) is satis ed in them.
Formal speci cations of POBAC
Before introducing the proposed policy speci cation language, formal de nition of the proposed access control model is presented. Figure 2 represents the overall structure of the model and all of the model components, which are de ned formally and precisely in the rest of this section.
De nition 5.1. Prioritized Ontology-Based Access ACP is an access control procedure. According to this procedure, the system decides to whether grant or deny an access request. ACP steps are de ned in Section 7.1.
In POBAC, each OSN with its de ned ontology has its own security knowledge base. The knowledge base contains a social network ontology, which is de ned in DL, and the OSN's security policy, which is de ned in the logic program. In fact, SKB is an MKNF + knowledge base. In what follows, these two elements of security knowledge base are de ned more formally.
De nition 5.2. Social Network Ontology (SNO): SNO is de ned as a binary hTBox; ABoxi, where TBox is the terminological box and ABox is the assertional box in MKNF + :
TBox includes, at least, the concepts and the relationships which are shown in the upper-level ontology in Figure 1 . In addition, TBox includes other concepts and relationships de ned in the domain-speci c ontology of OSN; ABox is the set of assertions about individuals existing in OSN and includes Subject(Sys). In OSN, the provider and the users must be able to de ne their own access control rules. For this purpose, access control rules structure and security policy are de ned formally in the rest. In an OSN, a user must be able to de ne the security policy for his/her resources such as notes, photos, and videos. UsersSP is a set of policies de ned by users. The security policy de ned by each user such as u i is modeled as a four-tuple hACR u i ; Exception u i ; Default u i ; CRS u i i containing the following elements: ACR u i is a set of access control rules de ned by u i ; Exception u i is a set of concrete access control exceptions de ned by u i ; Default ui is a default policy selected by u i . It is possible that for a request neither permission nor prohibition would be inferred from the SKB. In this case, if open policy is selected, the requested access will be granted. Otherwise, it will be denied; CRS ui is a con ict resolution strategy used for resolving con icts among access control rules de ned by the user. As POBAC supports the speci cation of both permissions and prohibitions; the occurrence of con icts among the derived authorizations is possible. Thus, approaches for resolving these con icts should be taken into account. More details of the proposed con ict resolution approach are presented in the next section.
Access control policy speci cation
In POBAC, security policy is divided into two parts, namely, users and system security policy. All of these policies accompanied by other required facts for access control are speci ed in the system using the MKNF + rules and predicates. The following sections describe the users and system security policy de nitions respectively. Furthermore, the proposed approaches to resolve the possible con icts among various rules are described. All the examples given in this section are based on the OSN graph and priority labels, which are represented in Figure 3 and described using DL and non-DL-predicates in Table 1 .
User access control policy
In the POBAC model, by using basic access control rules, exceptions, and default policy, users determine which subjects are authorized to do a speci c action on an object. For enforcing users' and the system's policies, several rules are de ned. A rule can be divided into an antecedent and a consequent. If conditions in the antecedent of a rule are satis ed by the knowledge base, predicates in the consequent of the rule will be added to the knowledge base.
In MKNF + , unlike DL-predicates, non-DLpredicates do not have any arity restriction.
Hence, we use non-DL-predicates for de ning predicates with arbitrary arity in our access control rules. Variables, which start with a lower case letter, and individuals, which start with an upper case letter, can be used as arguments of these predicates. Before describing the structure of users' and system's policies, priory labels, which are used in the de nition of the basic access control rules, will be described.
6.1.1. Priority labels Users can de ne various priority labels and assign them to their access control rules. By using these priorities, possible con icts among access control rules are resolved. Two approaches can be supposed for 
Non-DL e(Alice), e(Bob), e(Carol), e(Eve), e(Photo 1 ), e(FamilyPhoto 1 ), de ning priority labels for rules:
1. The OSN provider can de ne a set of priority labels as well as their inter-relationships. Hence, all of its users must use the same set of priority labels in this case; 2. Each user can de ne his/her set of priority labels and their inter-relationships.
To provide more exibility, we suppose that priority labels can be de ned by each user. Using the HasMorePriority predicate, users can de ne the relationship between two priority labels. HasMorePriority(x,y) determines that the priority level of label x is higher than the priority level of label y. Relationships de ned for priority labels are directive, irre exive, transitive, and acyclic. To enforce transitivity relations among priority labels de ned by a user, Rule (1) in the following is de ned. De ning cyclic relationships among priority labels usually occurs when a user makes a mistake in the de nition of priority labels and should be eliminated. Such con icts are supposed to be identi ed when a new relationship between two priority labels is being inserted into the knowledge base. To detect such anomaly in knowledge base, a propositional symbol error and an integrity constraint represented in Rule (2) are de ned. According to this rule, the error is inferred from knowledge base provided that the relationships de ned among the priority labels create a cycle. In this case, the de ned relationship is rejected and a warning message is shown to the user. These rules satisfy DL-safety restriction because p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 , which are our variables, occur in e, which is a non- (2) 6.1.2. Basic access control rule These rules are de ned by owners to determine which users are authorized to access resources shared in OSN. On the head of basic access control rules, permit and prohibit appear (see Table 2 ). An authority who grants a permission, a user who takes the permission, an action requested on the resource, the requested resource, and priority are parameters of permit and prohibit predicates. Various actions, namely, create, delete, read, and share are considered as the actions that subjects can do when they are in OSNs. Such actions are added to the knowledge base as individuals of the Action concept. In basic access control rules, various parameters such as types and properties of subjects and objects are used for de ning the rules. For specifying the priority of a rule, one of the priority labels should be assigned to each rule. For example, suppose the scenario that Alice does not tend to let her colleagues to access her videos and she assigns the 
6.1.3. Con ict resolution strategy Access control rules in some conditions might be in con ict with each other. Con ict between two rules occurs when one of these rules prohibits while the other one permits an action on a resource. Regarding that various properties can be used in the body of the rules, authorities can de ne complex access control rules. Therefore, it is possible that two rules might not con ict with each other in all states or con ict might occur just in special conditions. For resolving the con ict among rules, the following predicates are de ned (as represented in Table 2 ): 1. h-permit and h-prohibit: Users can de ne permission or prohibitions with various priority labels. To represent that a permission (prohibition) with either higher or incomparable priority level exists in the knowledge base, the h-permit (h-prohibit) predicate is de ned; 2. b-permit and b-prohibit: After resolving con icts among basic access control rules, for a request, bpermit or b-prohibit predicates might be inferred. In fact, these predicates are considered as the output of con ict resolution among the rules de ned by each user. Various priority labels might be de ned in the system. To show whether permissions or prohibitions with the higher priority labels exist in the knowledge base or not, propagation rules are de ned. Two scenarios are conceivable for comparison of the priority labels assigned to the contradictory access control rules: 1. The two priority labels are comparable and one of them has higher priority. In this case, Rule (4) and Rule (5) can be used to demonstrate the existence of the privilege with the higher priority label in the knowledge base. ! K h-prohibit(au; sbj; act; rsc; p 2 ): (5) 2. The two priority labels are the same. In this case, a user may attribute greater priority to either permission or prohibition. If a denial-takes-precedence policy is chosen, Rule (6) can be used for giving higher priority to the negative privileges than to positive privileges. Otherwise, Rule (7) ! K h-permit(au; sbj; act; rsc; p): (7) 3. The two priority labels are not comparable. Similar to the previous case, a user may attribute greater priority to either permission or prohibition. If a denial-takes-precedence policy is chosen, Rule (8) can be used for giving higher priority to the negative privileges than to the positive privileges. Otherwise, Rule (9) ! K h-permit(au; sbj; act; rsc; p2): (9) If permit (prohibit) is inferred for a speci c priority label and h-prohibit (h-permit) is not inferred for that label, then b-permit (b-prohibit) will be inferred. Therefore, Rules (10) and (11) ! b-prohibit(au; sbj; act; rsc):
(11) 6.1.4. Exceptions Using attributes of subjects and objects (by their types and properties) in the de nition of access control rules, instead of using their identities, eases the manageability of access control policies. However, in some cases, we need more precise policies. For illustration, users can join various groups in an OSN. Moreover, being a member of a group might be used as a parameter in de nition of an access control rule. As members of these groups are not determined by the user, it is probable that a user may not tend to share a speci c object to all members of a group. This type of policy is called exception policy and it can be considered as a white and black list, which is de ned for protecting users' resources.
As represented in Table 2 , e-permit and e-prohibit predicates can be used by users for de ning exceptions. All the input parameters of these predicates are individuals and no variables are used as parameters of these predicates. In fact, although access control rules are de ned based on the attributes of users and resources, the exception rules are just allowed to be de ned based on the identities of users and resources in this model. For instance, suppose the case that Alice does not tend to let Eve to see Note 1 . This policy is de ned as:
e-prohibit(Alice; Eve; READ; Note 1 ): (12) To prevent occurring con icts among exceptions, a new exception is inserted into the knowledge base provided that it does not have any con icts with other de ned exceptions. An integrity rule shown in Rule (13) is de ned for this purpose. In other words, by adding a new exception, no error should be inferred from the knowledge base. Otherwise, the de ned exception causes of such con icts will be eliminated and a warning message is shown to the user: K e-permit(au; sbj; act; rsc); K e-prohibit(au; sbj; act; rsc)!K error: (13) 6.1.5. Default policy After con ict resolution among various access control rules, fd-permit and fd-prohibit predicates (as represented in Table 2 ) will be inferred from the knowledge base. In some situations, it is possible to infer neither permissions nor prohibitions for a speci c request from the de ned access control rules. In this situation, based on the open or close policy which is de ned by users, the system decides whether the requested access should be granted or denied. Corresponding rules for enforcing open and close policies are represented in Rule (14) and Rule (15), respectively: not fd-prohibit(sbj; act; rsc) ! K fd-permit(sbj; act; rsc); (14) not fd-permit(sbj; act; rsc) ! K fd-prohibit(sbj; act; rsc): (15) 6.2. System access control policy Each OSN provider might have speci c access control rules for its framework. To distinguish system level from user level access control rules, the individual Sys is de ned as a member of the Subject concept. As an example, the system might de ne the policy that owners and users tagged on a resource are authorized to access it. Rules (16) and (17) are de ned for enforcing such policies. In these rules, the priority label P L 1 is considered for the last parameter of permit: K e(sbj); K e(rsc); K P erson(sbj); K Object(rsc); Owns(sbj; rsc) ! K permit(Sys; sbj; READ; rsc; P L 1 ); (16) K e(sbj); K e(rsc); K P erson(sbj); K Object(rsc); HasT ag(rsc; sbj) ! K permit(Sys; sbj; READ; rsc; P L 1 ): (17) User level rules are usually more complex than system level rules. In the system level, simpler con ict resolution strategies can be used. In the proposed model, denial or positive takes precedence are considered as two possible approaches for resolving con icts among the access control rules de ned in the system level. As shown in Figure 3 (c), P L 2 has higher priority than P L 1 . To enforce denial takes precedence strategy, P L 2 should be assigned to the negative rules and P L 1 should be assigned to positive ones. To have positive takes precedence strategy, the inverse approach should be followed.
Access control procedure and time complexity analysis
To enforce access control policy rules speci ed in this model, an access control procedure should be introduced. The time overhead of employing an access control system (developed based on the proposed access control model) depends on the time complexity of the procedure proposed for this purpose. In the following, after introducing the proposed access control procedure in this model, time complexity of this procedure is analyzed.
Access control procedure
As represented in Figure 4 , various priorities are considered for each rule type. In fact, the system level rules have higher priority than the other ones. Among the user level rules, exceptions have higher priority than the basic access control rules and both of these rules have higher priority than the default policy. For enforcing these priorities, a set of rules are de ned: 1. If the rules de ned at the system level permit (prohibit) a request, the request will be granted (denied):
K b-permit(Sys; sbj; act; rsc) (2)) are retrieved and are given to the PDP; 2. If error is not inferred by PDP, the de ned priority label will be added to the knowledge base. Otherwise, a warning message is shown to the user and the de ned priority label is discarded.
An access request is modeled in a triple hsubject;
action; objecti form. Application interface is used for sending users access requests to the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). According to SNO, as well as user and system level policies, the Policy Decision Point (PDP) decides whether the request must be granted or denied. Policy decisions made by PDP are enforced by PEP. After receiving an access request, the following steps are taken by PDP:
1. A query is sent to the knowledge base to discover the owner of the object; 2. The set of access control rules de ned by the authority, the rules corresponding to the selected con ict resolution strategy and the default policy, the priority labels de ned by the authority, and the OSN information (concepts, roles, and individuals) are retrieved from the knowledge base and are given to the PDP; 3. If the fd-permit(subject, action, object) predicate is inferred from the knowledge base, the request is granted. Otherwise, it is denied.
Time complexity analysis
The complexity of the access control procedure in our proposed model is completely dependent on time complexity of reasoning in MKNF + logic. Motik et al. [1] proved that the complexity of reasoning in MKNF + depends on the complexity of reasoning in its underpinning Description Logic (DL). If we take SHOIN as a widely used DL into account, the complexity of reasoning in this logic would be NExpTimecomplete.
Although the time complexity of access control procedure in this model is NExpTime-complete, it should be noted that for each access request, we just need to consider the rules of the user owning the requested resource as well as the general rules determined by the system administrator (named Sys) for all resources. Since the size of the part of the knowledge base considered for reasoning about a requested access is very small, such a complexity does not have signi cant overhead in access control procedure in practice.
Case study
To represent how our proposed access control model is applicable to OSNs, a case study is provided in the following. Suppose the social graph and the security levels represented in Figure 3 . In this scenario, the system and user level rules are as follows:
1. System level: The system lets owners and people tagged in an object to see it (Rules (16) and (17)). In this scenario, as no prohibition is de ned by the system, no con ict occurs among the rules; 2. User level: Alice de nes four priority levels, which are represented in Figure 3(b) . Moreover, she considers denial-takes-precedence strategy for con ict resolution among the access control rules. 
(c) Default Rules: Alice de nes close policy as her default policy. Among the policy rules de ned by the system and Alice, several con icts occur: 1. According to Rule (3) de ned by Alice, Carol's request to access V ideo 1 is rejected. However, according to Rule (17) , which is de ned in the system level, Carol is authorized to see V ideo 1 . In this context, as the rules de ned in the system level have higher priority than the rules de ned in the user level, Carol's request to access V ideo 1 is authorized; 2. Rule (24) permits Eve to see Note 1 . However, according to Rule (12), Eve is prohibited to see it. Since exceptions have higher priority than basic rules, Eve's request to access Note 1 will be denied; 3. Con icts among Rules (25)-(27) occur if a user such as Carol, who has both the close friend and colleague relationships with Alice, sends a request to access P hoto 1 . In this context, regarding that Rule (27) has higher priority than Rules (25) and (26), Carol's request to access P hoto 1 is denied.
Conclusion
OSNs are vastly used by di erent users with di erent avors and relationships. In OSNs, we desire to have two types of access policies, namely, system's policies and users' personal policies. But, due to the existing various and complicated relationships between the users and the variety of their shared resources, they may not understand the e ects and consequences of their de ned security policies and checking the leakage of permissions to unintended users might be error-prone. In this paper, we proposed a Prioritized Ontology Based Access Control (POBAC) model for OSNs in which a non-monotonic logic, named MKNF + , was leveraged for policy speci cation and inference. MKNF + is an integration of description logic and Answer Set Programming (ASP) rules; whereas DL is used in POBAC for modeling of OSNs' entities and their relationships (in two layers). Logical rules are employed for de nition and non-monotonic inference of access control policies. Non-monotonic nature of the employed logical framework in the proposed model enables users to easily de ne their access control policies, exceptions, and default policy to protect their resources in OSNs. In the proposed model, incompatible and con icting policies could be detected and their con ict could be resolved using di erent strategies, which are de ned by a set of labels placed in the vertex of a non-cyclic, irre exive, and transitive priority graph. Inference of access policies based on the hierarchies of entities (de ned in the two-layered ontology) and possibility of determining default policies in this model guarantee the coverage and coherence of the de ned policies for all types of resources.
Considering the mentioned properties of the proposed model, the following advantages could be enumerated for the proposed model in comparison to the traditional access control models [17] [18] [19] employed in OSNs:
Model liberality: The proposed model is a general model, which could be specialized for each OSN by customizing the domain-speci c ontology (speci ed as the lower layer ontology); Ease of administration: Using ontology of subjects, objects, and actions, a security o cer can easily specify his/her policy rules in di erent levels of abstraction. The non-monotonic features of the employed logic enable de ning exceptions and default access policies for easier de nition and management of access policies. Policy inference: In the proposed model, the ontology of engaging entities is speci ed by description logic and policy rules are speci ed by MKNF + rules. Thus, we can infer implicit policy rules (from the explicit de ned ones) based on the hierarchies and semantic relationships de ned between di erent entities in the ontology in presence of exceptions and default access policy; More expressiveness: The proposed access control policy language is more expressive than the one presented in the traditional DAC and RBAC models. For example, in this model, we can easily specify di erent complicated contextual conditions, which are impossible to de ne in traditional models. 
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